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Abstract: The main objective of the current study was to apply transaction cost economics approach to identify and quantify transaction costs and their impact on choice by principal agrocredit suppliers of the most efficient transaction contractual arrangements. Based on information from the sample of 78 agrocredit transaction contracts in Kibondo district, western Tanzania, we apply both qualitative and quantitative analytical tools to first, describe principal suppliers and institutional arrangements through which farmers access agrocredit; second to identify and quantify determinants of transaction costs involved in credit supply arrangements to smallholder farmers; and third to examine the relationship between transactions cost determinants and choice of agrocredit transaction arrangements. Five contractual transaction arrangements (CTAs) were identified and described qualitatively. Frequency distribution measures of central tendency indicated that CTAs involving intermediaries were found to have higher mean transaction costs compared to direct transaction arrangements. It was also found that there was high significant probability for more preference for private than state coordinated CTAs (a) if size of loans demanded is small; (b) if there is increase in monitoring and enforcement cost; and (c) if the distance between contracting parties increases (and vice versa for high preference of state coordinated CTAs). The logits for negotiation and enforcement costs were more significant in determining probability that private principal suppliers used CTAs with intermediaries than those without intermediaries. 
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INTRODUCTION
The provision on a sustainable basis of agrocredit​[1]​ and general financial services to farmers and rural inhabitants in developing countries has proved to be a very difficult challenge. In rural Sub-Saharan Africa the decline in supply from government agencies following structural adjustment reforms, has not been adequately compensated for by an increase in private supply, a situation exacerbated by the growing underlying demand for credit as farmers intensify production to respond to new market opportunities, as well as land scarcity and soil exhaustion. Dorward, et al. (2005) point out that the elimination by the government of credit, inputs and output subsidies and the privatization of agricultural marketing organizations (which has de-linked credit, input and output markets) have led to high market coordination failures​[2]​. In their study on the institutional adjustments to coffee trade liberalisation in Tanzania, Anna Temu and Nelson (2001) argue that although liberalisation has reduced costs in output market, it has however removed opportunities for linked input-output transactions that served to lower the costs of providing finance in state controlled parastatals. They found that irrespective of the fact that output marketing costs have fallen with general positive impacts on smallholder coffee farmers, there has been a massive rise of transaction costs for rural finance. They further argue that evaluation of trade liberalisation that focuses on output market alone ignores the rising transaction costs in financing necessary productive inputs particularly to small-scale farmers. Thus credit suppliers incur transaction costs to overcome transaction risks characterised by the absence of efficient complementary markets especially in poor rural areas. This poses a major policy challenge to developing financial institutions that are effective in targeting low-income small farm households while at the same time pursuing commercial viability. 

The ongoing market reforms and privatisation in Tanzania have not yet produced appreciable improvements in the provision of agricultural support services, nor have they increased farm profitability. If anything, small farmers often have less access to rural banking and to other institutional agricultural lending facilities than before (Ngaruko, 2008). It is obvious that entry and efficiency of formal agrocredit suppliers has been seriously delayed. The market has not opened up, and the market share for small and medium banks and other formal financial institutions is too low and it is hard for them to survive particularly in rural areas (Ngaruko, 2002). At the same time, the increasing competition in crop procurement among private commodity buyers has led to the emergence of a wide rage of contractual arrangements linking provision of agrocredit and crop procurement. However, agricultural land productivity is still below potential due to low investment in inputs required to raise land productivity and low take up and use of agrocredit. Existing literature (for example Kashuliza et al, 1998; Sharma, M. and M. Zeller, 2000; Atieno, 2001; Temu, A. and A. Winter-Nelson, 2001; Dorward, A. and J. Kydd, 2002; Baffes, 2003; Poulton, 2003; Conning, J. and C. Udry, 2005) provides two competing explanation for why farmers use so little agrocredit irrespective of adverse agrocredit sources: 

First, either that farmers are too great a credit risk; therefore higher interest rate is required to cover the risks. But farmers do not take up the credit at such high interest rates hence what is needed is for farmers to become lower risks for credit providers; and second, or that supplier’s transaction costs are too high in remote areas to allow adequate access to credit by farmers. These aspects have prompted the undertaking of the current research as elaborated in the subsequent sections. 

Irrespective of its importance in analysing agriculture sector development and the fact that agricultural transactions provide a rich and largely unexplored area for application and refinement of transaction cost theory, very few agricultural economists especially in developing countries have used Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach to address agricultural development paths. The comprehensive review of the empirical TCE research by Ngaruko (2008) reveals that there is so far little systematic statistical analysis of agriculture or the organisation of agriculture transaction from a transaction cost perspective.  The current study aims at bridging this knowledge gap by showing how TCE is more suited in assessing agriculture development issues in Tanzania through efficient seasonal input credit supply to smallholder farmers. The research adopts the TCE approach to identify and quantify agrocredit transaction costs and analyses their impact on choice by agrocredit transacting parties of the most efficient cost economising transaction arrangements. The findings from this study are also relevant to many other similar marginally developed areas in Tanzania.

SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Specifically, this paper seeks to meet three objectives: 
(i)	to describe principal suppliers and institutional arrangements through which farmers access agrocredit

(ii)	to identify and quantify determinants of transaction costs involved in credit supplying activities to smallholder farmers 

(iii)	to examine the structural relationship between transactions cost determinants and choice of agrocredit transaction arrangements. 

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Two specific hypotheses linked to objective (iii) were tested: 
(i)	The increase in transaction costs lowers the probability that private coordinated CTAs are more preferred than state coordinated CTAs in supplying agrocredit to smallholder farmers. This is due to the fact that the private traders are more sensitive to cost implied in factors like moral hazard and covariant risks than the state. 

(ii)	There is a significant positive relationship between transaction costs and probability that CTAs involving intermediaries are more used than CTAs involving direct interaction between principal suppliers and borrowers (farmers). Thus increase in transaction costs increases probability of suppliers using CTAs with intermediaries because they are more efficient in minimizing transaction costs than direct CTAs.

In the following section we summarise the literature review on transaction cost theory and its application in agriculture sector, with emphasis on developing countries.  We then outline a conceptual framework to explain the impact of market coordination failures on smallholder agrocredit market. In section three we outline the research methodology employed. The research findings for each objectives are covered in sections four, five and six respectively. In section four we present the qualitative description of the forms of agrocredit transaction arrangements in the study area, whereas in section five we quantify transaction cost variables associated with each supply transaction arrangement.  In section six we discuss structural relationship between transaction cost determinants and CTAs. We conclude the paper and suggest policy recommendations in sections seven. Reference list is included in section 8.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
TCE holds that all but the simplest transactions require some kind of mechanism to protect the transacting parties from various hazards associated with exchange. This mechanism is what Williamson (2000) refers to as the governance structure. The appropriate governance structure depends on the characteristics of the transaction, thus TCE implies an applied research programme of comparative contractual analysis i.e. how different forms of governance work in various circumstances. For this reason, TCE (associated with Williamson) is sometimes described as the “governance” branch of NIE, as opposed to the “measurement” branch (associated with Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). TCE is the most widely used approach in New Institutional Economics (NIE) related researches and in fact, as also pointed out strongly by Hubbard (1997), TCE stands at the heart of NIE. The governance approach is distinguished by its emphasis on incomplete contracts. With orthodox economic model of competitive general equilibrium, all contracts are assumed to be complete. TCE relaxes this assumption and holds that in the transaction cost framework, economic organisation imposes costs because complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete.  The contractual incompleteness exposes the contracting parties to certain risks. The need to adapt to unforeseen contingencies is an additional cost of contracting, failure to adapt leads to the so-called maladaptation costs especially for specific assets investments. TCE holds that parties tend to choose the governance structure that best controls the underinvestment problem (unwillingness to invest in specific assets without protection for contingencies), given the particulars of the relationship. More generally, contractual difficulties can arise from several sources (Klein, 1999) i.e. bilateral dependency, weak property rights, measurement difficulties and/or over searching, intertemporal issues that can take form of disequilibrium contracting, real-time responsiveness, long latency and strategic abuse, and weaknesses in institutional environment. Each of these has the potential to impose maladaptation costs. Foreseeing this possibility, agents seek to reduce the potential costs of maladaptation by matching the appropriate governance structure with the particular characteristics of the transaction. Thus, the main hypothesis of the TCE is that economic organisation is mainly an effort to align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with the governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly transaction cost economising) way  ADDIN EN.CITE (Williamson 1975; Menard 1997; Williamson 2001). The role of TCE is therefore to give explanation of how trading partners choose, from the set of feasible institutional alternatives, the arrangement that protects their relationship-specific investments at the possible least cost (Klein, 1999, p.468). 
Application of TCE in Agriculture 
Irrespective of its importance in analysing agriculture sector development, very few agricultural economists especially in developing countries have used TCE approach to address agricultural development paths. Hubbard (1997) agrees with this view by pointing out that “….agricultural economics has been less guilty of this omission than other branches of microeconomics, despite having long incorporated risk and uncertainty of yield and income.” The comprehensive reviews of the empirical TCE research by Boerner and Macher (2001) and Wang (2003) reveal that there has been little systematic statistical analysis of agriculture or the organisation of agriculture transaction from a transaction cost perspective. However Masten (2000) notes that agricultural transactions provide a rich and largely unexplored area for application and refinement of transaction cost theory.  Masten further argues that agricultural transactions display a broad range of governance structures, including the location-specific nature of the investments required and the temporal specifications associated with the perishability of the agricultural products. Boerner and Macher (2001) point out that the nature of agricultural products and production means physical and human asset specificities likely play a less important role in agricultural transactions in comparison to the temporal and vocational specificities associated with production, processing and distribution of farm produce. Perishability (which affects quality) of farm produce tends to exacerbate contracting hazards between contracting parties, while geographic and process disparities between contracting parties tend to impede the administration and coordination of activities. Based on this premise, Knoeber (1983) examined the governance of fruits and vegetable processing and dairy processing and found that there was a significant connection between hold-up problems, and temporal and location specificities.  Another body of literature on the empirical studies of TCE in agriculture is connected to the examination of the extent and use of long term contracting in agriculture. Purceli (1990) examines the growth of long term contracting and prevalence of integration between feedlots and beef processors brought on by the site specificity that exists. Allen and Lueck (1992, 1996) study the use of relatively simple short term contracts in farming, and argue that the simplicity of these agreements reflects the comparative advantage of enforcing farmland contracts through the market and common law. The authors suggest that the character of the farming economy, namely good information about reputations, the immobility of farmers and land owners, relatively low transaction costs and the desire to maintain long term relationships, lends itself to the pervasive use of informal, simple contracting. 

Applying NIE approach, Fafchamps (2004) gives a bird’s eye view of the practical functioning of market institutions in Sub Saharan Africa. Using descriptive statistics and logistic regression analysis Fafchamps shows that theft and breach of contract is low among agricultural traders and that losses resulting from such are small, suggesting that such market institutions in SSA work well. Further econometric analyses showed that exposure to risk such as overnight storage is a significant risk factor. Other significant theft risks were found to be risk of ambush and employee-related theft. Therefore traders avoid exposure to risk and breach of contract by sleeping in their stores, payment of protection money and travel in convoys, refraining from hiring additional workers, and adopting commercial practices that leave little room for abuse of contract. Among the common commercial practices include cash and carry transactions, infrequent supplier credit, uncommon placement of orders, and virtual absence of payment by check or invoicing. Although Fafchamps (2004) did not quantify the transaction costs associated with comparable forms of trade arrangements, much of his theoretical and analytical insights are useful in assessing and quantifying transaction costs that are associated with contractual arrangements in other markets such as agrocredit markets. Fafchamps provides methodological approach on data collection (questionnaire designing) and data analysis (descriptive statistics, and econometric modelling and testing of primary data) that are particularly relevant to the current study. 

Impact of Market Coordination Failures on Agrocredit Supply Chain: A Basis for Conceptual Framework 
Following Dorward et al (2005) model of market coordination failures in poor rural areas, and earlier conceptualisation of the subject by Kydd and Dorward (2004), we consider a farm credit market in which each credit supplier has a unique set of transaction cost related to costs of doing a profitable business with the right business partner (through middleman or directly with a profit maximising smallholder farmer). Under market coordination failures the supplier has to invest in assets that are specific to credit supply business (e.g. training and recruitment of rural credit officers). In addition, the supplier has to devote time and transport costs searching for the right business partner. Thus the supplier adopts certain institutional arrangements to avoid losses due to transaction costs and risks. Other than investing in specific assets, other factors such as seasonality in demand for farm credit, many but small credit transactions (frequency of transaction) as well as the complexity nature of the lending mechanism oblige the supplier to devise formal or informal contractual arrangements with the trading partner. Thus, other than costs of transacting, supplier faces additional costs of designing, negotiating and enforcement of the contracts (Gabre-Madhin, 2003). Whereas transaction costs are characterised by level of investment in asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty of transactions, contracts on the other hand are characterised by level of contract control, ability to walk away, substitutes to contracts, party’s own identity in the contract, duration, ex ante control, ex post importance, information sharing, enforcement, etc. All these factors influence the overall transaction cost refereed to by Dorward (2001) as “governance costs” (GC).

Governance costs differ among credit suppliers due to their differences in their characteristics (e.g. wealth, income sources, capital investment, agent’s preference and commitments, market share, access to information, education, technology level, experience, etc). These features shape the resulting credit/loan and transaction characteristics which eventually determine the governance form and terms.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research design and study area
The research design of the current study is constructed around the TCE theory and methods common to quantitative research using the field based case study approach. This research design is well adapted to the complex nature of the credit supply to remotely located small holder farmers.  The approach supports the goal of discovery and deeper understanding of the actual behaviour of economic actors in thin markets. The primary data were collected from Kibondo district between October and December 2005.  The district is one of the four administrative districts located in the northern highlands of Kigoma region, which is located in the western part of mainland Tanzania. According to the 2002 Tanzania National Census, the population of Kibondo District was 414,764 (200,381 male and 214,383 female) with a population growth rate of 4.2 percent​[3]​ and a household average size of 7.1. The district has a land area of 16,058 km2 equivalent to 43.3% of total land area of the region. Administratively the district is divided into four divisions of Kibondo urban, Kakonko, Kasanda and Mabamba.  The current study concentrated on the first three divisions. Mabamba division which is an entrance point of refugees from Republic of Burundi was insecure for researcher and his team to carry out interviews in the ward.

Cases Selection and Data Collection Methods
Cross sectional primary data were obtained from the selected cases. Each credit transaction contract (C) for each credit transaction arrangement/governance structure (GS) was treated as an independent case from which information was to be collected. Cases were selected purposefully. Contractual objects or units (U) from which data were obtained varied both between contracts and between governance structures. The sampling unit for each case comprised of one or a combination of a programme, a firm, a person, or a group of people. Figure 1 presents a hypothetical credit transaction arrangement with two governance structures (GS1 and GS2) each with three different transaction contracts (C). Data was collected from units (U) involved in the respective contracts. This implies that GS1 and GS2 could be two different credit supply contractual arrangements used by one organisation or by two independent organisations respectively. The contractual forms and terms (C) are not necessarily similar for each GS. The case units (U) were real parties involved in the respective contract (C). Thus U could be the same for two different Cs but behaving differently depending on the attributes of the transaction as well as of the contracting partners. Major tools used to collect data were oral interviews and semi structured questionnaire, documentary review and direct observation. This study followed the Dorward’s (2001) simplest pathway in primary data collection in which a researcher observes variables of interest in the field and immediately records the data. 

Qualitative Data Analysis 




Figure 1: Conceptual framework linking governance structures, transaction contract and case study units












Multinomial Logistic Modelling  
To estimate the impact of transaction costs on the use of particular type and forms of CTAs by credit suppliers (objective iii), a Multinomial Logistic Model was developed to describe the probability of each of the possible choice of CTAs as a function of transaction cost characteristics​[4]​.  Verbeek (2004) notes that the important goal is to describe these probabilities with a limited number of unknown parameters without necessarily ordering the possible outcomes (CTAs). The model outcomes (CTAs) were thus not naturally ordered so that each alternative has a random utility level and that individual CTAs that have highest utilities are chosen. In the current case, utility refers to transaction cost economization. All probabilities should lie between 0 and 1 and, over all alternatives, add up to 1. The utility of each CTA is a linear function of observed transaction cost characteristics plus an additive error term. The suppliers of agrocredit would therefore choose to transact through the CTA which had the highest transaction cost-economising potential. With appropriate distributional assumptions on the error terms, this approach leads to manageable expressions for the probability implied by the model. To formalise the model, let us assume that the CTAs are indexed  (where for the current study M=5) noting that the order is arbitrary. Assuming further that the utility level to economise on transaction cost by agrocredit supplier linked to is given by , where  is a non stochastic function of observables and a small number of unknown parameters, and  is an observable error term. From this it follows that
	
                                                                                     1
In order to evaluate equation 1, all ij are assumed mutually independent with a log Weibull distribution (also known as a Type I extreme value distribution) (Verbeek, 2004). In this case, the distribution function of each  is given by             
    			                                                                2
Given the fact that equation 2 does not involve unknown parameters, equation 1 can therefore be expressed as 
		                                        3    
Equation 3 implies that  and that.  It should further be noted that the distribution of  sets the scaling of (undefined) utility but not of location. Thus to solve for this problem one of the deterministic utility levels is normalised to zero, say. The multinomial logistic model assumes that  is a linear function of observable variables, which may depend upon the individual , the alternative outcome, or both, that is  (Greene, 2003). Equation 3 can thus be expressed as
                                                                                  
							  4
Equation 4 represents a multinomial logistic/logit model or sometimes referred to as independent logit model (Verbeek, 2004). If there are only two alternative outcomes (M=2), it reduces to the standard binary logistic/logit model where the probability of choosing alternative is a simple expression of explanatory variables and coefficients  because of the convenient assumptions made about the distribution of the unobserved error. In the current study, the term  includes explanatory transactions cost variables described in table 1. Variables used in the empirical analysis, their definitions in the current study and key descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 1. 

Table 1: Variable definition, description and statistics

Variable	N	Definition	Descriptive statistics
CTA1	78	Probability that suppliers will choose CTA1 (DIRECT PRIVATE) 1=CTA1   0 =otherwise	1=33 observations0= 45 observations
CTA2	78	Probability that suppliers will choose CTA2 (DIRECT FO) 1=CTA2   0 =otherwise	1= 13 observations0= 65 observations

CTA3	78	Probability that suppliers will choose CTA3 (DIRECT GOVT) 1=CTA3   0 =otherwise	1= 8 observations0= 70 observations
CTA4	78	Probability that suppliers will choose CTA4 (INDIRECT PRIVATE) 1=CTA4 0 =otherwise	1= 6 observations0= 72 observations
CTA5	78	Probability that suppliers will choose CTA5 (INDIRECT GOVT) 1=CTA5   0 =otherwise	1= 18 observations0= 60 observations
CREDIT	78	Total value of credit transactions in previous season (TSh) 	Minimum=50,000Maximum=20 millionMean= 1.5 million
CRESIZE	60	Value of credit per  transaction contract (TSh)	Minimum=1,000Maximum=640,000Mean= 68,551
SEARCHCOST	78	Total borrower searching/screening costs per contract (TSh)	Minimum=0Maximum=73,000Mean=3,721 
NEGOTIATECOST	78	Total contract negotiation cost (TSh)	Minimum=0Maximum=101,000Mean=8,927
ENFORCECOST	78	Total contract monitoring and enforcement cost (TSh)	Mean=0Maximum=85,000Mean=14,902
REMOTENESS	64	Distance between borrower’s home and loan processing office (Km)	Minimum=0.25Maximum=45Mean=4.79
FREQUENCY	71	Number of credit transaction contracts with the current borrower 1=if second or more time borrower                0=if first time borrower	1=41  observations0=30 observations

RESEARCH FINDINGS ON OBJECTIVE (I): FORMS OF AGROCREDIT CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE STUDY AREA
Figure 2 illustrates five broad categories of credit contractual arrangements (CTAs) through which farmers were accessing agro-credit in Kibondo district. The CTAs are analogous to institutional arrangements as explained in TCE theory.  It should be noted that a farmer engaged in both food and cash crop production was likely to transact with almost all the four principle suppliers.  However the farmer was treated differently by same agro credit supplier based on interpersonal relationships, type and form of agro-credit as well as type of crop concerned. In the following sections we briefly outline the five agro-credit transaction arrangements as illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Smallholder agrocredit supply chain in Kibondo 

* DALDO – District Agriculture and Livestock Development Office

Private Trader – Smallholder Farmer (CTA1)
This is the agrocredit transaction arrangement whereby a principal private trader directly supplies agrocredit to a farmer without involving any third party. Private traders in this arrangement are mainly individual crop buyers, farm input traders, and moneylenders. CTA1 covers almost all commodity supply chains with an exception of the supply chain where agrocredit supply is interlocked with commodity procurement, e.g.  the case of tobacco and cotton supply chains.
 
Farmer Organisation – Smallholder Farmer (CTA2)
As with CTA1, CTA2 involves direct transactions between agro credit principal supplier and borrower farmer. In this case the principal supplier is farmer organisation which refers to a union of a number of farmer groups with a mandate to commercially compete with other actors in the given commodity supply chain. This arrangement is common with agrocredit products such as input cash, fertilizer on credit, crop storage and other market function such as crop transportation, processing, grading and packaging. 

DALDO – Smallholder Farmer (CTA3)
Figure 2 shows that CTA3 involves the direct dealings between the government represented at district level by the District Agriculture and Livestock Development Office (DALDO) and the farmer. The main agrocredit product involved in CTA3 is input seed for increased staple grain food crop production i.e. the maize, rice and beans. No cash is involved in this arrangement since a farmer returns part of harvest to DALDO on the agreement of “get one return two” basis (100% interest rate per production season).

Private Trader – Intermediaries – Smallholder Farmer (CTA4)
Unlike CTA1, CTA4 involves participation of intermediaries in the transaction. The intermediaries range from government, private traders, crop buyers and farmer organisations to rural entrepreneurs. Thus CTA4 could take any of the channels 1-5 in Figure 2. The range of agro credit products involved in this arrangement is also wide whereby the principal private supplier prefers a certain intermediary for certain forms of agrocredit product.  Examples of principal private traders in CTA3 include Tobacco Leaf Company, cotton development trust fund (CDTF), coffee bean pulping factories, truck owners, international- and national-wide NGO etc. 

DALDO – Farmer Organization – Smallholder Farmer (CTA5)
This is another agrocredit trade arrangement whereby the government (DALDO) indirectly deals with farmers through farmer groups or farmer organisation. Both cash and in-kind agro credit products were involved in this arrangement.  CTA5 cuts across all crop and livestock supply chains but more so on grain seed (maize, beans and rice) and also on nitrate fertilizers. The financial credit is also supplied to wellorganised groups and organisations of farmer. The government coordinates formation of sound farmer groups which in future are expected to become or form Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOS). In most cases DALDO would not deal with individual farmer cases if the farmers were not backed up by their respective farmer group or organisation. As a result of this, it was learnt that majority of smallholder farmers were belonging to farmer groups formed on the basis of practicing same farming system.

Table 2: Frequency distribution of sample credit transaction contracts by CTA

CTA*	CTA1	CTA2	CTA3	CTA4	CTA5	Total
	(DIRECT PRIVATE)	(DIRECT FO)	(DIRECT GOVT)	(INDIRECT PRIVATE)	(IDIRECT GOVT	
Percent	42.3	16.3	10.3	7.7	23.0	100.0
Source: Own Survey data (2005)

Table 2 shows the frequency distribution of 78 agrocredit contracts from all the five CTAs from a survey in the Kibondo district. It can be noted from table 2 that CTA1 (Direct Private) had the largest percentage of sample contracts whereas CTA4 (Indirect Private) had the lowest percentage of sample contracts. About 69.0% of sample contracts were made through CTAs (CTA1-3) which involved direct interaction between principle suppliers and the borrowers. The remaining 30.7% of contracts were concluded under CTA4 and CTA5 which involved intermediaries to coordinate transactions between agrocredit supplier and farmer.
RESEARCH FINDINGS ON OBJECTIVE (II):  DESCRIPTION OF AGROCREDIT TRANSACTION COST ATTRIBUTES OF CTAS IN THE STUDY AREA

Attributes of Search/Screening Costs for Different CTAs

The expenditure by the suppliers on transport to and from the borrower was the main source of cost of search and screening the borrower. CTA1 (Direct Private) had the lowest total borrower search/screening cost whereas the highest screening cost was experienced by CTA3 (Direct Govt). The total search cost for CTA3 which was just over twenty times the search cost incurred by CTA1 and about five times the sample mean search cost. Table 3 also shows that the search costs are higher for government coordinated transaction than transactions coordinated through private traders if the transactions involve direct interaction between the principle transacting parties. The same trend is also indicated for transactions involving intermediaries but the costs are higher for CTA4 (Indirect Private) than those incurred in CTA1 (Direct Private). Transaction costs for CTA5 (Indirect Govt) are lower than those of CTA3 (Direct Govt) but still higher than the sample mean. Time taken from borrower searching and screening to credit delivery to the borrower was the shortest for TCA1. Table 3 further indicates that loan processing time increases with third parties involvement in the transactions. 

Table 3:  Distribution of mean values of attributes of search/screening cost per transaction contract by CTAs

Attribute 	Direct interaction	Indirect interaction	Sample
	CTA1	CTA2	CTA3	CTA4	CTA5	
Transport cost to and from the borrower farmer during searching and screening the borrower (TShs)	722.73	1538.46	13562.50	2633.33	5119.44	3337.2
Time taken from searching/screening to credit delivery to the borrower (hours)	12.43	18.93	69.25	59.08	56.78	33.17
Time each meeting/consultation with the borrower takes (hours)	1.45	1.28	8.63	0.58	5.02	2.95
Total value of tips, fees, rents or any charges paid in the process of knowing each other (trade partners) (TShs)	35.71	N/A	4000.00	166.67	100.00	394.7
Total cost paid to the third party/person who did the searching/screening (TShs)	192.31	N/A	N/A	1250.00	628.57	569.70
Time taken by the third party/person to complete borrower searching/screening (hours)	32.00	0.13	37.50	14.50	29.00	24.54
Total borrower searching/screening cost (TShs)	783.33	1538.46	15062.50	3583.33	5691.67	3721.80
Source: Own Survey data (2005)
Attributes of Negotiation Cost for Different CTAs
Table 4 shows that with an exception of CTA3 (Direct Govt) in which it took 3 hours to complete negotiation of the contract between parties, it took less than an hour with other CTAs to complete negotiation of one contract. CTA2 had the smallest mean time (about half an hour) to complete negotiation. The Government coordinated contracts take shorter negotiation time if intermediaries are involved (i.e. CTA3 Vs CTA5 respectively). The major cost element of negotiation cost was the cost paid to negotiators where needed. It should be observed from Table 4 that CTA4 and CTA5 which are arrangements involving third parties, show higher mean cost incurred as payment to the credit contract negotiator. Even where parties were bilaterally interacting, some witnesses or translators were necessary to facilitate negotiation. In most cases these translators were people with reputation in the village such as primary school head teachers, priests and extension agents who would demand for some unofficial special consideration of their time spent.
 
Table 4: Distribution of mean values of attributes of negotiation cost per transaction contract by CTAs
 Attribute	Direct interaction	Indirect interaction	Sample
	CTA1	CTA2	CTA3	CTA4	CTA5	
Time it took to reach agreement (hours)	0.77	0.38	3.00	0.60	0.79	0.85
Total cost paid as payment to the credit contract negotiator (TShs)	1433.33	462.50	5687.50	17083.33	14722.2	6050.0
Cost incurred in compiling a legal contract document (payment for fees, stamps, lawyers etc) (TShs)	3335.30	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.00	2500.0
Total negotiation cost (TShs)	2115.15	8795.83	12487.50	17416.70	17611.1	9043.51
Source: Own Survey data (2005)

The other element of negotiation cost was costs incurred in compiling a legal contract document but only very few direct private coordinated contracts (CTA1) required legal formalities. Overall table 4 shows that total negotiation costs for CTA1 and CTA2 were smaller than the sample mean but higher in CTAs 3-5. This implies that contractual arrangements involving third parties were associated with higher costs of negotiation.

Contract Monitoring and Enforcement Cost for Different CTAs
As with other forms of transactions costs described in the previous sections, Table 5 shows that transport to and from the borrower during contract monitoring and enforcement was the most significant element of contract monitoring and enforcement transaction costs across CTAs. With an exception of CTA5 (Indirect Govt.) which had mean transport cost above sample mean, the other CTAs exhibited mean transport costs lower than the sample mean.  The costs incurred as expenditure for each trip for allowances, lunch, drinks, stationary etc for government coordinated transactions i.e. CTA3 (Direct Govt.) and CTA5 (Indirect Govt.) were highest of all CTAs and higher than the sample mean. This conforms to high administrative costs of most state programmes. Such costs are minimal with other CTAs since unlike public services, private firms normally run their business at the lowest cost possible. 

Table 5:  Distribution of mean values attributes of contract monitoring and enforcement cost per transaction contract by CTAs
 Attribute	Direct interaction	Indirect interaction	Sample
	CTA1	CTA2	CTA3	CTA4	CTA5	
Number of trips credit supplier made to and from the borrower to monitor the credit contract	3.00	0.0	2.00	2.00	2.00	2
Transport costs to and from the borrower for each trip (TShs)	19411.76	N/A	19866.67	10250.00	53333.33	22489.3
Time spent with the borrower for each trip (hours)	2.68	3.0	1.42	1.13	2.42	2.28
Costs incurred as expenditure for each trip for allowances, lunch, drinks, stationary etc (TShs)	5094.40	N/A	10714.29	4000.00	7100.000	6568.8
Any payments such as fees, tips, rents etc paid for each trip (TShs)	1666.67	N/A	11300.00	0.00	15333.33	8958.3
Estimated cost of assessing/measuring quality/quantity of farm produce (TShs)	1500.00	2000.00	24100.00	3000.00	15333.33	11800.0
Estimated monetary cost incurred as a result of borrower's breach of contract (TShs)	30000	N/A	42000.00	50000.00	0.00	19000.0
Estimated cost of case filing charges, lawyer's payments, government levies, revenue stamps, personal transport etc (TShs)	18333.30	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.00	13750.0
Cost incurred to pay the third party who enforced the credit contract on behalf of the credit suppler (TShs)	190.91	0.00	375.00	2141.67	1643.75	637.5
Estimated total payments made to the borrower to maintain social harmony e.g. social contributions, fundraising, school fees etc (TSh)	765.15	125.00	1142.85	800.00	229.42	576.35
Total contract monitoring and enforcement costs (TShs)	15492.42	269.23	37512.50	15641.67	14094.44	14902.6
Source: Own Survey data (2005)

The estimated mean monetary cost incurred as a result of borrower's breach of contract for CTA4 (Indirect Private) was about 72% higher than the sample mean. Cost incurred to pay the third party who enforced the credit contract on behalf of the credit supplier was highest with CTA4. For both CTA4 and CTA5 the costs of using third parties to enforce the contracts were higher than the sample mean.  Estimated total payments made to the borrower to maintain social harmony e.g. social contributions, fundraising, school fees etc were also significant especially with CTA1, CTA3 and CTA4 which were higher than the sample mean. Overall CTA4 had the highest contract monitoring and enforcement cost whereas CTA2 (Direct Fo) had the least total monitoring and enforcement costs.

Attributes of Remoteness of Borrower
It can be observed from Table 6 that the mean distance between borrower and supplier under CTA3 (Direct Govt.) was the highest and almost three times above sample mean. This is so since the government officials could manage to travel deep into the remote area using motorcycles. This can also be explained by the fact that borrowers had to travel to the DALDO headquarter in the district township where in-kind input credit such as seeds were stored and distributed. 

Table 6: Mean values of indicators of remoteness of borrower categorised by CTAs

 Attribute	Direct interaction	Indirect interaction	Sample
	CTA1	CTA2	CTA3	CTA4	CTA5	
Distance between borrower's home and loan processing office (km)	3.95	3.06	13.94	1.30	3.82	4.79
Distance between the borrower's home and trade centre nearby the borrower (km)	12.08	3.39	3.88	6.50	4.29	7.66
How far the borrower is from a point where the road is impassable by motor car (km)	2.73	0.80	0.78	0.88	0.67	1.65
Time of travel from loan processing office to borrower's homestead (hours)	1.05	1.50	1.18	1.00	1.75	1.25
Source: Own Survey data (2005)

Summary of the Features of Transactions costs for Different CTAs
Table 7 summarizes magnitudes of key attributes of transaction cost for each form of CTA.  It can also be noted that transaction arrangements involving intermediaries (indirect arrangements) i.e. CTA4 (Indirect Private) and CTA5 (Indirect Govt.) have the higher mean transaction costs compared to direct transaction arrangements i.e. TCA1-3. The mean transactions costs for CTA4 and CTA5 are higher than the sample mean whereas the mean transaction costs for the other CTAs were below the sample mean. This suggests that transaction arrangements involving intermediaries are more associated with higher transaction costs compared to those involving direct interactions between transacting parties. 




Borrower search/screening cost (TShs)	783.33	1538.46	15062.50	3583.33	5691.67	3721.8
Contract negotiation cost (TShs)	2115.15	8795.83	12437.50	17416.70	17611.10	9043.5
Monitoring and contract enforcement cost (TShs)	15492.42	269.23	87512.50	15641.67	14094.44	14902.6
Total (TShs)	18390.9	10603.5	23002.5	36641.7	37397.2	27667.9
Source: Own Survey data (2005)

RESEARCH FINDINGS ON OBJECTIVE (III): RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION OF ESTIMATED LOGISTIC MODELS

Results of the logistic regression analysis of the structural relationship between transactions cost determinants and choice of agrocredit transaction arrangements are summarized in Tables 8 and 9, respectively representing multinomial and binary logistic regression outputs. Table 8 presents the probability that the supplier decides to use a CTA that is just appropriate to avoid risks of high transaction costs.  Table 9 presents two independent binary logistic regression results i.e. first, the impact of transaction costs on the decision by agrocredit suppliers to use direct CTA (compared to indirect CTA) and second, the impact of transaction cost on decisions by agrocredit suppliers to opt for private coordinated CTAs (as compared to state coordinated CTAs). The models were all significantly well fitting​[5]​. This is evidenced by the highly significant likelihood ratio test (-2 LL) Chi Square, goodness-of-fit test, and Cox and Snell R2. The likelihood ratio test for individual model parameters (last column in Table 8) suggests that the significant transaction cost variables affecting choice of efficient CTA by agrocredit suppliers were size of credit, enforcement cost, remoteness of borrower, and frequency of transactions.​[6]​ The -2LL chi-square statistic on the supplier’s volume of revolving capital for agrocredit business, costs of searching and screening borrowers as well as contract negotiation costs were found statistically insignificant. 

MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The logistic coefficients of the multinomial models (1-5) are presented in table 8. Each model corresponds to one of the reference dependent category for comparison purposes. The parameter estimates (logits) are presented for all independent variables for all category models except for the reference category​[7]​.  Table 8 indicates that model 4 and model 5 are the most parsimonious models.  Model 4 presented in column 4 in table 8 shows the logits for the model with indirect private credit arrangement (CTA4) as the preference category. With reference to CTA4, model 4 presents test results of the null hypothesis of the probability that there was no significant difference in impact of explanatory variables on efficiency of the two comparable agrocredit arrangements with a state as the principal supplier (i.e. CTA3 and CTA5). The state’s involvement in agrocredit delivery either through direct interaction between the DALDO and borrowers CTA3 (DIRECT GOVT) or through intermediaries CTA5 (Indirect Govt.) was influenced by four main factors namely; Cresize, Enforcecost, Remoteness and Frequency. Estimated parameters for Remoteness and Frequency were positive and significant for both governance structures whereas the parameter for CRESIZE and Enforcecost were negative for both governance structures but statistically significant with CTA5. These results indicate that if the institutional environment for agrocredit transactions prompt increase in demand for agrocredit by more remote farmers as well as increase in number of repeat borrowings by individual farmers, then direct government involvement through either form is necessary. This condition is more so for CTA3. As with CTA1 and CTA4, the appropriateness of CTA5 or CTA3 is significant only if farmers prefer small credit sizes to large credit sizes. Model 4 shows that the probability that the government (DALDO) used CTA5 (Indirect Govt.) to deliver agrocredit to farmers decreased with demand for larger credit sizes. The logits for credit size variable (CRESIZE) suggests that the effect of credit size was more pronounced and statistically significant with CTA5 than CTA3. The parameter for enforcement cost was significantly negative implying that increase in contract monitoring and enforcement costs reduced probability that the state preferred use of intermediaries (CTA5) to an alternative form (CTA3). 

Model 5 presents logits for CTA categories with delivery of agrocredit to farmers by the government through intermediaries (CTA5) as the reference category.  With CTA5 as a reference category, it is thus possible to compare the effect of transaction cost variables on comparable forms of private CTAs. For instance, the parameter estimate for credit size suggests that the larger the credit size the higher the probability that private agrocredit suppliers will prefer use of intermediaries (CTA4) instead of direct interaction with the borrowers (CTA1). This implies that unlike smaller credits, a larger credit size poses a greater risk of loss in cases of borrowers’ failure to comply with ex post contract terms. This in turn, forces private principal suppliers to involve (hire) better informed third parties to assist in searching and screening potential borrowers, in negotiating, and in monitoring and enforcing the contracts. This implies that, unless the size of loans demanded per farmer is justifiably large, the appropriateness of CTA4 is limited. Thus CTA4 was mostly used by larger suppliers and larger farmers e.g. tobacco companies contracting with large scale farmers (relative to other tobacco farmers in the district) through intermediaries such as individual farmers, farmer groups or district council. 

These findings are supported by the significant logits for negotiation and enforcement cost. The logits were more significant in determining probability that principal suppliers preferred CTA4 to CTA1. In both arrangements, increases in negotiation cost had a negative impact on decisions to contract, but this was more significant with CTA4. The enforcement cost, on the other hand, had a positive relationship with the two comparable CTAs, although this relationship was significant for CTA4 only. This observation suggests that any higher ex ante transaction costs (costs prior to actual contract agreement such as negotiation costs) could be avoided by defecting from the contract. However, the principal supplier has no choice but to incur costs which are as high as necessary to avoid contract failure (implying higher transaction cost): hence positive relationship between CTAs and ex post transaction costs (such as contract monitoring and enforcement costs). This suggests the increase in transaction cost incurred by the supplier (by hiring third parties) is lower than it would be with contract failure or with total market failure, whose extreme impact would be the absolute absence of agrocredit from private suppliers. 

The econometric analysis further indicates that remoteness between principal suppliers and farmers matters in selecting the most appropriate and efficient form of credit supply arrangement. The increase in remoteness, which implies increased transport cost (fare, contingencies and security against robbery or theft on transit), decreases the probability that private suppliers will use CTA4. This is so because of higher anticipated transaction costs due to claims made by third parties when dealing with distant borrowers. Given the poor transport and communication network in smallholder family settings in the study area, very few uninsured suppliers would wish to take obvious risk of dealing with large amounts of credit (which is the case with CTA4). In addition, from a moral hazard perspective it would be likely that the principal supplier would be cheated by the third party, unless the principal incurs additional costs to monitor the third party’s opportunistic behaviour. As a result of this very distant farmers in the district were left unattended by larger suppliers. Unlike the case of CTA4, the sign of the parameter estimate for remoteness is positive for CTA1, implying that when distance between private suppliers and borrowers increases, suppliers tend to interact with borrowers directly without any intermediaries (CTA1). This is the case for small credit sizes which may not be profitable enough to justify use of third parties. The highly significant negative parameter estimate for frequency of transactions between agrocredit supplier and borrower suggests that an increase in number of farming seasons during which the supplier has been supplying credit to the farmer reduces the probability that the supplier uses CTA4 in subsequent credit arrangements. The impact is more pronounced with CTA1 than with CTA4. This implies that CTA1 and CTA4 are more appropriate to first time borrowers than experienced borrowers. This is due to the fact that overtime the supplier gathers sufficient information about the borrower which enables him/her to decide whether or not to extend supply and if necessary to personally deal with the farmers (CTA1) in the subsequent season, thereby reducing transaction cost of using a third party intermediary. This finding denotes that private suppliers tended to avoid highly experienced borrower farmers and that the interests of suppliers were short term since they preferred to supply more credit to a particular borrower in the first farming season but less or none in the following seasons. 

Table 8: Logit coefficients of Multinomial Logistic Regression analysis for the 5 CTA alternativesa

CTA category	Explanatory Variables	Model 1Reference category1	Model 2Reference category 2	Model 3Reference category 3	Model 4Reference category 4	Model 5Reference category 5	-2LL Chi- Squareb








































Likelihood Ratio -2LL Chi-Square   	105.196***	105.196***	105.193***	105.196***	105.196***	105.196***
 Pearson Chi-square      	9.832***	9.834***	9.832***	9.832***	9.832***	9.832***
Cox and Snell R2                                             	0.923	0.923	0.923	0.923	0.923	0.923

a  Ward test statistic was used to test significant logits for individual variables. * significant at .10, ** significant at .05 *** significant at .01
b  Model Chi-Square test of Null Hypothesis that all the logistic regression coefficients except the constant are zero i.e. logit(p)= the constant.













Cox & Snell R2	0.568	0.436
Nagelkerke R2	0.761	0.577
Hosmer &Lemeshow Testd	4.349	7.862
-a Ward statistic in parentheses  
-*  significant at 0.10   ** significant at 0.05   *** significant at 0.01
-b Dependent variable: Direct (no intermediaries) CTA = 1, Indirect (with 
     intermediaries) CTA = 0 
-c Dependent variable: Private coordinated CTA = 1, Government 
     coordinated CTA = 0
-d The Hosmer & Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Chi square   0.05 for both models​[8]​
Binary Logistic Regression Analysis: Results and Discussions
Table 9 summarizes results of the binary logistic regression analysis of two models: Model 1 analyzed transaction cost factors responsible for the preference by contracting parties to directly interact each other without intermediaries. Model 2 analysed the transaction cost factors influencing choice of CTAs coordinated by private sector in the agrocredit business.  

It can be noted from table 9 that the cost of monitoring and enforcing contracts (ENFORCECOST) and distance between farmers and suppliers of agrocredit (REMOTENESS) had positive impact on the choice by parties to interact each other directly without intermediaries involved. That is, increase in ENFORCECOST and REMOTENESS prompted principal contracting parties (principal supplier and farmer) to prefer direct interaction between them. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Summary of Key Research Findings
The empirical analysis of transactions costs determinants of agrocredit transaction arrangements has revealed that the impact of transaction cost determinants for emergence and preference by contracting parties for CTAs, varied across different CTAs.  Borrower’s searching and screening costs and contract negotiation costs were not statistically significant in determining preference of CTAs. The most important transaction cost determinants with impact on formation and preference of different CTAs by contracting parties were contract monitoring and enforcement costs, remoteness of borrowers, frequency of transactions between contracting parties, and demand for agrocredit (value of credit demanded per contract).   The analysis has proven that changes happening to these transaction cost attributes to a greater extent were associated with the decisions made by agrocredit suppliers to prefer use of different credit transaction arrangements (governance structures). For most of the CTAs, the mean values for contract monitoring and enforcement costs were the highest followed by mean values for searching and screening costs, whereas contract negotiation costs had the least mean values. In each category, transport costs topped all other transaction cost determinants due to remoteness of most borrowers. It was noted that overall, transaction arrangements involving intermediaries (indirect arrangements) i.e. CTA4 (Indirect Private) and CTA5 (Indirect Govt) had higher mean transaction costs compared to direct transaction arrangements i.e. CTA1 – CTA3. The mean transactions costs for CTA4 and CTA5 were found to be higher than the sample mean whereas the mean transaction costs for the other CTAs were below the sample mean.

The test results of the first specific hypothesis suggest strong evidence that transaction costs impart decisions made by principal suppliers (both private and state) in selecting transaction costs economizing CTAs. The study has found that there is a high probability that more preference for private coordinated CTAs  than state coordinated CTAs if size of loans (CRESIZE) demanded is small; if there is increase in monitoring and enforcement cost (ENFORCECOST); and if the distance between contracting parties increases (and vice versa for high preference of state CTAs).  The parameter for enforcement cost was significantly negative implying that increase in contract monitoring and enforcement costs reduced probability that the state preferred use of intermediaries (CTA5) to an alternative form (CTA3). 

The logits for negotiation and enforcement costs were more significant in determining probability that private principal suppliers preferred use of CTAs with intermediaries (CTA4) to those without intermediaries (CTA1). In both arrangements, increases in negotiation cost had a negative impact on decisions to contract, but this was more significant with CTA4. The enforcement cost, on the other hand, had a positive relationship with the two comparable CTAs (CTA1 and CTA4), although this relationship was only significant for CTA4. This observation suggests that the principal supplier has no choice but to incur costs which are as high as necessary to avoid contract failure (implying higher transaction cost) by using intermediaries: hence positive relationship between CTAs and ex post transaction costs (such as contract monitoring and enforcement costs). This suggests the increase in transaction cost incurred by the private supplier (by hiring third parties) is lower than it would be with contract failure or with total market failure, whose extreme impact would be the absolute absence of agrocredit from private suppliers.

In this context an approach to market access, namely that of economic actors engaging in transactions rather than a large number of atomistic firms constituting a ‘market’ is imperative to gaining an understanding of market access for small-scale farmers in developing countries. It is often only the well endowed and skilled that has the ability to be part of these marketing chains and alliances. There is therefore a danger that the contractual terms and crop quality requirements of the corporate agrocredit suppliers (processors, exporters, banks etc) in developing countries, can act as effective barriers to participation in the high value chains by producers. This study has indicated that for a small number of farmers in developing countries who have the ability to be part of these hybrid market institutional arrangements, however, the reward could be substantial.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
State’s Coercive Roles To Support Private Contracts
The key distinction between public (the government) and private sector is the monopoly by the former over the use of public forces to enforce laws and regulations. The paper has convincingly revealed that monitoring and enforcement costs were the most significant determinants of total transactions costs facing suppliers of agrocredit in the study area. Thus the government can decrease barriers to agrocredit by private suppliers by putting public force to support contract enforcement. The use of courts and other public forces like the police force and local councils by private suppliers most of whom were not formerly registered was virtually non-existent. The use of these forces to enforce private contracts was perceived by many suppliers as being too costly due to the prolonged bureaucracy and over protection of farmers by the government. 

Institutionalisation of Market Contractual Arrangements
The study findings have shown that agrocredit transactions can take place even in very crudest institutional environment. In this case, transactions evolve around long-term personal relationships. Thus the major objective of any market institutions policy has to be facilitation of credit supply that is appropriate for particular crop and contracting partners. The policy has to facilitate movement from personal to impersonal contractual arrangements. This is what is regarded by North (1993) as the most relevant institutional challenge.
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^1	  Agrocredit in the current study refers to either financial or inkind credit extended to smallholder farmers for primary purpose of investing the credit in farm production and commodity marketing.
^2	  Market coordination failure is narrowly defined here as the situation where one or some of the complementary markets or activities are missing in an economy thereby affecting performance of other markets. In this case credit, inputs and output markets are complementary to each other thus absence of one affects the other.
^3	  The national annual population growth rate was 2.6% (Tanzania Census, 2002).
^4	  Multinomial logistic regression analysis uses Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) method to calculate the logit coefficients. This contrasts to the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of coefficients in linear regression analysis. OLS seeks to minimize the sum of squared distances of the data points to the regression line. MLE seeks to maximize the log likelihood (LL) which reflects how likely it is (the odds) that the observed values of the dependent may be predicted from the observed values of the independents.
^5	 The likelihood ratio test tests the null hypothesis that the logits except for the constant are 0. This implies that none of the independents are linearly related to the log odds of the dependent category. 
^6	  Verbeek (2004) notes that the likelihood ratio test of individual parameters is a better criterion than the alternative Ward statistic when considering which variables to drop from the logistic regression model. 
^7	  As explained in section 3.4 logistic regression applies maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent into a logit variable (the natural log of the odds of the dependent occurring or not). In this way, logistic regression estimates the probability of a certain event occurring. Note that logistic regression calculates changes in the log odds of the dependent, not changes in the dependent itself as OLS regression does (Gujarati, 2006). 
^8	  Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness of fit test divides subjects into deciles based on predicted probabilities, and then computes a chi-square from observed and expected frequencies. A probability (p) value is computed from the chi-square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom to test the fit of the logistic model. If H-L goodness of fit statistic is greater than 0.05 as we want for well fitting models, we fail to reject the null hypothesis which states that there is no difference between observed and model-predicted values, implying that the model’s estimates fit the data at an acceptable level. That is, well-fitting models show non significance on the H-L goodness of fit test, indicating model prediction is not significantly different from observed values.
